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Abstract:
Why did Victorian Britain invest so much capital abroad? We collect over 500,000 monthly
returns of British and foreign securities trading in London and the United States between 1866 and
1907. These heretofore-unknown data allow us to better quantify the historical benefits of
international diversification and revisit the question of whether British Victorian investor bias
starved new domestic industries of capital. We find no evidence of bias. A British investor who
increased his investment in new British industry at the expense of foreign diversification would have
been worse off. The addition of foreign assets significantly expanded the mean-variance frontier and
resulted in utility gains equivalent to a meaningful increase in lifetime consumption.
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Never before or since has one nation committed so much of its national income and 
savings to capital formation abroad. –Michael Edelstein
1 
 
It is estimated that between 1865 and 1914 Great Britain invested more than £4.1 
billion nominal pounds abroad.
2 For a nation that until 1850 had exported less than two 
percent of its gross domestic product, this was a prodigious sum that represented 5.4 
percent of GDP.
3 At the same time that British capital was leaving the island at 
unprecedented levels, British industry began a decline that signaled the beginning of 
Britain’s transformation from world’s workshop to banker. While it was no surprise that a 
nation would eventually surpass Britain in industrial might, the speed of the reversal 
caused much consternation among the British elite. The city of London, with its perceived 
propensity to funnel capital overseas rather than into domestic industry, was widely 
suspected of hastening the decline of British industry. According to this view, London's 
capital markets systematically discriminated against domestic industry by ignoring 




C.K. Hobson, writing in 1914, commented on the hysteria: 
 
A few years ago the British public was startled by a new cry--the cry that capital was being driven 
abroad...Foreign investment was regarded as a new and portentous phenomenon, without 
precedent in the history of the country, as a running sore, sapping the life blood of British 
industry...The matter was discussed in Parliament. A well-known statesman made the discovery 
that all the great ships going westward across the Atlantic were carrying bonds and stocks in 
ballast...Other speakers lamented the increase in unemployment and the stagnation of trade, which 
they attributed to the unparalleled outflow of capital—C.K. Hobson (1914), The Export of Capital, 
p.i 
 
Hobson was engaging in hyperbole, but the feeling that “the city of London and its 
financial institutions were the single greatest threat to the prosperity of England” was 
                                                 
1Edelstein (1981 p.70)  
2Cottrell (1975, p. 27) and Stone (1999, p.6) both estimate £4.1B was raised on the London stock exchange. 
These estimates amount to a lower bound as total overseas investment includes the £4.1B  raised on the LSE 
plus foreign direct investment and the purchase of foreign securities trading outside of London. 
3The pre 1850 overseas investment estimate is from Edelstein (1982, Table 2.1 p.21). The aggregate nominal 
U.K. GDP estimate is from Lawrence H. Officer, "What Was the U.K. GDP Then?" MeasuringWorth, 2008. 
URL: http://www.measuringworth.org/ukgdp/ 
4See O'Rourke and Williamson (1999) Chapter 12 for an excellent review of the capital market failure view 
of British industrial decline.  Work by Crafts, et al, (1989) and Broadberry (1997) provide evidence that 
counters the conclusion of outright British industrial decline prior to the First World War.   3
widespread.
5 By 1931 John Maynard Keynes and his colleagues on the Macmillian 
Committee had formerly accused the London capital markets of ignoring domestic 
industry. 
 
It is all-important to the community that its savings should be invested in the most fruitful and 
generally useful enterprises at home...our financial machinery is definitely weak in that it fails to 
give clear guidance to the investor when appeals are made to him on the behalf of home industry—
Committee on Finance and Industry (Macmillian Committee) 1931. 
 
Since the Macmillian Report, the charge of foreign bias has resonated throughout 
the literature. Proponents of the view that British capital markets failed argued that 
domestic investors sent capital abroad due to bias or ignorance.
6 
 
There is strong evidence that it [the London capital market] was not perfect, that there was 
virtually total ignorance among financial institutions and advisors about investment opportunities 
in home industry, and that banks and other institutional lenders operated with traditional and 
irrational prejudices as to which type of investments they should support and which they should 
not.—Pollard (1987, p.460) 
 
Proponents of rational markets responded with an appeal to revealed preferences. 
British investors who sent capital abroad must have believed that this was the optimal use 
of their funds. To proponents of rational markets, this was strong evidence that the returns 
offered by the forgone domestic investments must have been inferior to their international 
counterparts.
7 
It is important to note that both sides of this debate framed their arguments in the 
context of which investment (domestic or foreign) had a higher expected return. The focus 
on return is appealing. If Victorian investors expected to earn higher returns overseas, this 
could explain capital flows abroad without having to resort to claims of bias. On the other 
hand, if British investors discriminated against domestic securities, the price of these 
securities would be lower (and their returns higher) than would otherwise be the case. 
Given the focus on returns, one would think that the debate about capital market 
bias would have ended in 1982 when Michael Edelstein published Overseas Investment in 
                                                 
5Rosenstein-Rodan (1967) Capital Movements and Economic Developement p.68. 
6For instance Crafts (1979), Pollard (1985) and Kennedy (1974, 1987). 
7For example, McCloskey (1970,1979), Temin (1987, 1989), Michie (1988) and O'Rourke and Williamson   4
the Age of High Imperialism. In this impressive work, Edelstein computed the realized 
annual return of 566 foreign and domestic assets listed on the London stock exchange 
between 1870 and 1913. He concluded that the return on foreign assets was, on average, 
slightly higher than domestic assets and this difference was statistically insignificant after 
controlling for risk via the capital asset pricing model. 
Rather than end the debate, Edelstein's work simply revitalized the antagonists. The 
proponents of efficient markets cited the absence of higher returns on domestic assets as 
evidence of market efficiency. The proponents of market failure responded by questioning 
Edelstein’s sample selection and noting that the relative spread between foreign and 
domestic returns fluctuated with long periods of higher domestic returns. In short, the 
difference between Edelstien's domestic and foreign returns was too similar and the data 
too noisy to convince either side their position was wrong.
8 
Much of the disagreement in the literature can be traced to the focus on returns and 
the faulty premise that Victorian investors had to choose between investing either at home 
or abroad. In their 1999 text, O'Rourke and Williamson reviewed the literature to date 
 
The claim is that the City of London systematically discriminated against domestic borrowers, 
preferring instead to channel funds into overseas ventures. The result was that domestic British 
industry, starved of capital, grew more slowly than it would otherwise have done. An obvious 
implication of the hypothesis is that domestic (British) rates of return must have exceeded those 
available on foreign investments—O'Rourke and Williamson (1999, p.226) 
 
The implication that domestic rates of return must have exceeded those available 
on foreign investments is not the obvious implication of capital market bias. If British 
investors were biased against domestic assets this bias would manifest itself in a higher 
domestic rate of return then would otherwise be the case. Whether the effect of bias was 
sufficient to make domestic rates of return exceed foreign depends upon the magnitude of 
the bias and other factors that influence asset returns such as risk and diversification. 
Comparing the magnitude of domestic and foreign returns is a valid test of capital 
market bias if, and only if, domestic returns have equal or lesser risk and investors are 
forced to choose between investing all of their savings either at home or abroad. When 
                                                                                                                                                   
(1999). 
8O'Rourke and Williamson (1999) provide an excellent summery of the debate. Pollard (1985) and Kennedy 
(1987 p.146-147) are prominent examples of critics who were unconvinced by Edelstein's work.   5
investors are given the opportunity to divide their money between home and foreign 
assets, the expected rate of return on domestic assets can exceed the expected rate of return 
on foreign assets and an unbiased, rational investor will still choose to invest a portion of 
her wealth overseas if the diversification benefits of foreign investment outweigh the loss 
of return. 
In our opinion, diversification is a likely explanation for the high level of Victorian 
overseas investment. Foreign asset returns had a low correlation with domestic asset 
returns. Nineteenth century investors were certainly sophisticated enough to realize the 
benefits of international diversification. C.K. Hobson, writing in 1914, suggested that 
Victorian investors sent capital abroad due to their desire to “spread risks by investing in 
various countries or in diverse industries.”
9 Turn of the century investment guides 
encouraged overseas investment as a form of insurance against domestic market declines. 
As early as 1907, Holt Schooling published a remarkable article that drew upon historical 
returns to document the low correlation between Victorian-era British and foreign asset 
returns. Schooling concluded, “the safe and profitable investment of capital, as distinct 
from speculative finance, depends upon the sagacious distribution of the investment of 
capital in different parts of the world.”
10 Two years later, in 1909, Henry Lowenfield 
published one of the first investment guides, Investment: an Exact Science. Lowenfield's 
work included detailed graphs of 19th century ex-post returns. His graphs showed the large 
yet uncorrelated movements of British and foreign securities during the Victorian and 
Edwardian eras. The magnitude and independence of the movements led Lowenfield to 
advise, “it is impossible for any investor safely to invest his capital in any one country.”
11 
Diversification seems like a plausible explanation for Victorian overseas 
investment. It is therefore surprising that the dominant explanation for the high level of 
British overseas investment ignores diversification and relies upon a market failure 
(irrational bias) to explain Victorian investment. The reliance on bias is surprising because 
economists who study modern portfolio choice lament the refusal of modern investors to 
hold more foreign assets. Ironically, the same market failures (bias, transaction costs, or 
information asymmetries) that are used to explain the low levels of international 
                                                 
9Hobson (1914) .xiii. 
10Schooling (1907) p. 137   6
diversification observed in modern portfolios are also cited as explanations for the high 
level of Victorian investment abroad. If we are to seriously take the view that modern 
home bias can be explained by these market failures, a logical extension is that the high 
levels of international investment observed in the 19th Century is evidence of market 
efficiency, not failure. 
Why isn’t the high level of international investment present in 19th Century 
portfolios viewed as a sign of rationality and efficiency? In a word, covariance. When 
economists assert that modern investors should invest a higher percentage of their wealth 
in foreign assets, they are basing this conclusion on the diversification benefits of holding 
foreign assets with a low covariance with domestic assets. Economists studying Victorian 
portfolio choice have largely ignored covariance (and hence diversification). There are two 
reasons for this omission. First, the debate was framed in the years before mean-variance 
analysis of portfolio decisions became standard. At the time that Rostow (1949) and 
Cairncross (1953)  literally wrote the books on Victorian overseas investment, an 
investment was evaluated by its return, not its effect on the return and risk of one's 
portfolio. Despite advances in our understanding of portfolio choice under uncertainty, the 
optimality of Victorian foreign investment continues to be framed as a decision about asset 
return rather then risk.  
The second, and probably more important, reason that diversification has been 
ignored is the practical problem of a lack of data. Before we can hope to evaluate the 
diversification benefits of foreign investment we must be able to measure the covariance 
between domestic and foreign assets. Prior to our data, the available security returns were 
too sparse to apply the statistical tests and consumption comparisons we utilize. 
Recent work by Goetzmann and Ukhov (2007) use Edelstein’s annual data to 
contribute to the debate on Victorian capital market bias. The authors describe the 
investment technology of the 19
th century Victorians, particularly communication 
advances. Similar to this paper, Goetzmann and Ukhov employ modern portfolio theory to 
compute optimal portfolios and compare the risk and return characteristics of domestic and 
internationally diversified investments. This paper differs in methodology and most 
importantly the scope of available data. Edlestein’s sample was limited to the annual 
                                                                                                                                                   
11Lowenfield (1909) p.43   7
returns of 566 securities trading in London, while our new data contains the monthly 
returns of 4,059 securities trading in London and the United States. The Monthly 
frequency allows us to employ the statistical tests and compute the consumption gains 
common in the portfolio choice literature.  
Beyond methodological differences, the breadth our data permit us to construct 
portfolios that better reflect the underlying debate on Victorian capital market failure. For 
example, Kennedy (1987) argues that the British capital market discriminated against 
domestic high tech firms such as electric utilities. Edelstein’s data contains only three 
domestic and six foreign electric companies. This is too few to confidently draw 
conclusions about the risk and return of investment in British versus foreign electrical 
firms. By contrast, our data set contains twenty-eight British and twenty-one foreign 
electric firms. More importantly, our data set is more representative of the investment 
opportunities available to Victorian Investors. For example, nearly a quarter of the total 
capital raised on the London Stock Exchange and roughly half of all capital invested 
abroad was placed in foreign government securities.
12 We observe 213 non-colonial 




Victorian Investment Data 
We address the lack of data by collecting asset returns from 1866 to 1907 trading 
in both London and the United States.
14  The data were hand entered from 19
th and early 
20
th century financial publications.  London price data were collected from the Friday 
official lists published in the Money Market Review, while the London dividend and share 
data source from the Investor's Monthly Manual and The Economist.  The United States’ 
price, dividend, and share data were collected from the Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle's price lists and investor's supplements, the Mining Record, and the hand written 
                                                 
12 Michie (1988) Table 3.3 
13 Edelstein (1982) Table 5.1. Edelstein does include 52 colonial government bonds in his sample. We 
observe 110 colonial bonds in addition to the 213 non-colonial bonds. Colonial bonds traded as if they had a 
implicit guarantee from the British crown. They therefore provided little diversification for a British investor 
who held domestic sovereign debt.  
14 United States exchanges include New York, Baltimore, Boston, Cincinnati, Charleston, Louisville, 
Philadelphia, St. Louis, and San Francisco.   8
ledgers Records of Stock Brokers and Stock Exchanges.
15 
The data were selected by collecting all securities listed in both the Money Market 
Review and the Commercial and Financial Chronicle in the December of each sample 
year.  This process might introduce a survivorship bias, albeit small, in that stocks listed in 
January and de-listed in November will not enter into our sample. Also, in order to make it 
into the final dataset, each security must be matched with corresponding dividends and 
shares.  Lastly, to eliminate errors, all data were double entered and compared. 
Prices were sampled every 28-days between January 1866 and December 1907, 
roughly 86 percent of the Victorian overseas investment boom.  Importantly, our sample 
includes the 1893 and 1907 panics, both of which severely affected foreign markets, and 
hence diversification opportunities. 
Our data consists of closing bid and ask prices, shares, and dividends of 2,242 
stocks and 1,817 bonds, that traded in London or the United States.
16  Gross returns are 
calculated for two consecutive non-missing time periods by equally weighting the bid and 
ask prices at each point in time, adding any paid dividends.  After correcting for capital 
calls and stock splits, the panel contains 518,224 individual 28-day stock and bond returns.  
Financial data tends to display a high rate of attrition, with many companies trading for a 
fraction of the entire time frame.  The amount of entry and exit within our panel is 
heightened by bonds reaching maturity (few are perpetuities), and the substitution of new 
stock for old. The average life of an individual security within our data set is 9.8 years.
17 
We sort securities by geographic region and industry and compute value-weighted 
indexes. Each asset is determined to be British, U.S., foreign, or British 
colonial/protectorate.
18 As markets thickened throughout 1866-1907, financial publications 
sorted securities into industrial categories such as foreign government bonds, foreign 
                                                 
15 The Records of Stock Brokers and Stock Exchanges is located at Harvard's Baker Library.  
16 The London and U.S. Stock Exchanges were the most liquid exchanges during the Victorian Investment 
Boom.  For excellent history of the size and efficiency of these exchanges see Michie (1988). 
17 With 4,059 securities spanning a 42 year period our dataset could be populated with over 2.2 million 
observations.  A balanced panel of this sort is unlikely due to entry, exit, and the maturation of securities.  A 
similar result can be found in modern data, as the population of CRSP data over the past 21 years yields 65 
percent of the data missing.  In addition, Little’s (1988) MCAR test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the 
missing data within our sample is missing completely at random. 
18 Information regarding whether a company was foreign or domestic was determined by the company name, 
e.g., “South African Breweries,” or from various web-based resources, such as the UK National Archives, 
www.nationalarchives.gov.uk.   9
railroads, electric, gas companies, etc.  We use this information to further divide the data 
into value-weighted indexes that reflect specific types of investment opportunities. 
We employ these heretofore-unknown data to investigate the effects of 
international diversification on the portfolios of Victorian investors. This is the first study 
to use 19th century data that is both broad enough and sampled at a high enough frequency 
to apply the mean-variance spanning tests common in the modern portfolio choice 
literature. This is also the first study of Victorian investment to include assets trading on 
the exchanges of the United States as well as London. There is considerable evidence that 
British investors held a large number of assets listed on the exchanges of the United 
States.
19 By adding U.S. assets to the choice set, we hope to better reflect the true set of 




We sort assets into portfolios corresponding to type and geographic location. For 
the purpose of this study we define a company as foreign if it is located outside of the 
United Kingdom or if it exists to raise capital for overseas ventures. Thus in addition to 
companies located abroad we classify investment trusts and banks as foreign if they are 
headquartered in London but invest their capital abroad. Details of the portfolio 
compositions, and the average 28-day gross returns, standard deviations and correlation 
coefficients can be found in Tables 1-2. 
The ex-post returns and correlations provide prima facie evidence of the 
diversification benefit of international investing.  The foreign government bond portfolio 
had both a high return and a low correlation with domestic assets.
20  Likewise, foreign 
corporate bonds had higher returns than their domestic counterparts with slightly higher 
risk. 
The ex-post diversification benefits apparent in Tables 1 and 2 cry out for a formal 
test. Were these benefits real or simply a reflection of sampling error? Even if the 
                                                 
19See Wilkins (1989) Chapters 4-5 
20 Both Temin (1987) and Kennedy (1987) have suggested that British investors had a “fear of equities” and 
preferred to invest in foreign government bonds. Ex-post, this seemed to be a wise decision as foreign 
government bonds simultaneously delivered high returns and diversification benefits.   10
differences are statistically significant, were the apparent benefits from international 
diversification meaningful enough to explain the Victorian penchant for overseas 
investments? To answer these questions we require a method to evaluate the mean-
variance trade-offs available to 19th century British investors. 
 
Evaluating the Benefits of International Investing 
We utilize a method that encompasses both risk and return to evaluate the affect of 
the addition of foreign assets into the portfolios of British Victorian-era investors. We 
present three measures of the benefits of international diversification. The first is a 
straightforward statistical evaluation of the null hypothesis that the addition of foreign 
assets provided no diversification benefits. The second is an estimation of the wealth gain 
a British investor would demand before willingly refraining from international investment. 
The third measure estimates the optimal weights on the global efficient portfolio and 
compares the estimated weights to actual market weights at the time.  Together these three 
methods ask if the addition of foreign assets expanded the mean-variance investment 
frontier available to 19th century British investors, what was the extent of the utility gain, 
and were the actual holdings during the period optimal? 
 
The Mean-Variance Frontier 
Given a set of assets with expected return vector  , μ  and covariance matrix Σ, the 
mean-variance frontier is the boundary set of means and minimum variance portfolios. 
One can trace the mean-variance frontier by choosing a vector of weights to minimize 
portfolio variance for different values of  . k  











     (1) 
  A graph of two mean-standard deviation frontiers formed by domestic and 
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Figure I 


























Domestic + Foreign Assets
 
Domestic Assets = British Gov. Bonds, British Corp Stocks & British Corp. Bonds 
Domestic + Foreign Assets = Domestic Assets + Foreign Gov. Bonds, Foreign Corp. Bonds and Foreign 
Corp Stocks. 
 
Figure 1 appears to confirm the diversification benefits of international investing.  
A word of caution is in order. Ex-post estimates of the mean-variance frontier are formed 
by replacing μ  and Σ with their sample estimates μ ˆ  and Σ ˆ .  Even if the ex-anti domestic 
portfolios were mean-variance efficient, an ex-post frontier constructed from the finite 
sample estimate μ ˆ and Σ ˆ  will lie to the left of the domestic portfolios.  
Did the addition of foreign securities actually expand the ex-ante mean-variance 
frontier or are the observed ex-post differences the result of sampling error? To answer this 
question we require a test of the likelihood that an observed expansion of the ex-post 
mean-variance frontier was the result of sampling error. If the addition of foreign assets 
actually expanded the mean-variance frontier of Victorian investors, we should be able to 
reject the hypothesis that the observed benefit is the result of sampling error.   12
 
A Spanning Test 
Under what conditions would the inclusion of a foreign asset fail to expand the 
mean-variance set of potential investments? Huberman and Kandel (1987) show that the 
vector of L domestic assets,  , t R  span a foreign asset,  , t r  if  







t t t      (2) 
If (2) holds, one can replicate the expected return of the foreign asset with a portfolio of 
domestic assets. If this is the case, the foreign asset is redundant and its inclusion had no 
effect on the ex-ante mean-variance frontier. If  t R  does not span  t r , however, then the 
inclusion of the foreign asset expands the mean-variance frontier. Thus one can test for 
spanning by estimating (2) via OLS and evaluating the joint restrictions on the 
coefficients. 
 
A Spanning Test with Short Restrictions 
The Huberman-Kandel spanning test may not be restrictive enough to capture the 
real-world constraints faced by Victorian investors. The spanning test in (2) does not rule 
out short positions. Although it was often easier to short stocks in the 19th century than it 
is today, for many investors short restrictions were a realistic constraint when choosing 
their optimal portfolios.
21 Therefore, whenever we reject the null hypothesis of spanning, 
we should ask if the apparent diversification benefits of international investing rely upon 
the ability to sell assets short and form highly leveraged portfolios. If the results depend 
upon short sales, we should question whether the apparent gains from diversification are 
consistent with the general equilibrium market clearing condition that all assets must be 
held. 
DeRoon, Nijman, and Werkers (2001) show how to manipulate the minimization 
problem in (1) to derive a spanning test with short-sale constraints. Consider an investor 
                                                 
21 Short selling based on reputation-based forward contracts was widespread during the period of Victorian 
overseas investment.  Not only were short sales prolific, there is evidence that the value of derivative 
contracts was sometimes larger than spot trades (Harrison, 2004, 2004a, and Dickson 1967).  More evidence 
of the prevalence of short sales comes from the fact that multiple laws attempted to restrict such trades.  Such   13
who maximizes the following utility subject to a short sales constraint
22 
1   subject to  
2
1
max = Σ −
′ ′ ′ 1 w w w w
0 w γ μ
≥     (3) 
 γ  is a coefficient of risk aversion. By altering , we can trace the upward sloping portion 
of the short-sale constrained mean-variance frontier. The resulting short-sale constrained 
frontier consists of a finite number of unconstrained frontiers formed from subsets of the 
assets in (3).
23 By altering γ , we can identify the various subsets. For example, given the 
choice of investing in the British domestic portfolios and the foreign government bonds 
portfolios, Figure 2 graphs the optimal weights for different values of γ . 
Figure 2 
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Figure 2 illustrates the risk and return trade-off as one alters γ. The vertical lines 
mark the endpoints of the three subsets of R.  A risk neutral investor (γ = 0) will choose to 
place all of her wealth in the portfolio with the highest expected return (the foreign 
                                                                                                                                                   
laws were eventually rescinded.  The first law attempting to curtail short sales was enacted in 1697, with 
further attempts made in 1720, 1734, 1746, 1756, and 1771 (Harrison, 2004). 
22 This utility specification provides a convenient illustration of the derivation of the short-sale constrained 
spanning test. The resulting test does not depend upon a specific utility function.  
23 Markowitz (1991) and DeRoon, Nijman, and Werkers (2001)   14
government bond portfolio). As we increase γ and re-solve (3), the optimal weights 
continue to consist of all wealth in the foreign government bond portfolio until the 
coefficient of risk aversion reaches 6.8.  
An investor with 6.8 < γ < 10.5 prefers to forgo some expected return in favor of 
the diversification benefit from splitting her money between the foreign government bond 
portfolio and the British corporate bond portfolio. Recall the expected returns and standard 
deviations from Table 1. The British corporate bond portfolio had a smaller return and a 
greater standard deviation then the British government bond portfolio. Nonetheless, due to 
the negative correlation between British corporate bonds and foreign government bonds, 
an investor who holds foreign government bonds would rather diversify her holdings with 
the British corporate bonds instead of British Government bonds. This decision would be 
deemed irrational if we neglect covariance and only focused on returns and variances.  
Investors with γ < 10.5 choose to further diversify their portfolios by splitting their 
wealth between foreign government bonds, British corporate and British government 
bonds.  
Figure 2 also illustrates how the short-sale constrained mean-variance frontier can 
be decomposed into different subsets. For small values of the frontier consists of a single 
point defined by the mean and variance of the foreign government bond portfolio. For 6.8 
< γ < 10.5 the frontier consists of a convex combination of the foreign government and 
British corporate bond portfolios. For γ >10.5 the frontier is comprised of a convex 
combination of the foreign government bond, British corporate bond and British 
government bond portfolios.  
Let 
∗ ) (γ w  denote the solution to (3) for a given γ . Let ν  denote the inverse of the 
Lagrange multiplier for the restriction in (3) that  1 ) ( =
∗′1 w γ . Define 
) (γ
t R  as the subvector 
of  t R  that contains only those assets with non-zero weights in 
∗ ) (γ w . DeRoon, Nijman, 
and Werkers (2001) show that the short-sale restricted frontier comprised of the assets in 
[ t R   t r ] and short-sale restricted frontier comprised of the assets in  t R  alone, intersect at 
the point 
∗ ) (γ w  if the restriction in (5) holds for the regression in (4) 
  t t t ε δ + + =
) (γ R a r      (4)   15
  1 ≤ + 1 a δ ν       ( 5 )  
To test for mean-variance spanning, subject to short restrictions, solve (3) for 
increasing values of γ until the P finite subsets of  t R  are identified. Let 
] [ p
t R  denote the p-
th subset and ν
[p]max and ν
[p]min denote the maximum and minimum values of ν  that 
correspond to the end points of the p-th subset.  t R  spans  t r  with short constraints if (6)-
(7) hold for all p  
t
p
t t ε δ + + =






1 ≤ 1      (7) 
We estimate (6) for each subset simultaneously via seemingly unrelated regression. 
Let  α ˆ  denote the 2P x 1 vector equal to the difference between the left and right hand 
side of (7). Under the null hypothesis that Rt  spans  t r  the test statistic in (8) is 
asymptotically distributed as a mixture of 2 distributions  
) ˆ ( ] ˆ [ ) ˆ ( min ) (
1
0 α α α α α ξ
α − − =
−
≤ Var p     (8) 
Kodde and Palm (1986) show that under the null p is asymptotically distributed as a 






Var i N w c c p
0
2 ]) ˆ [ , , ( Pr )) ) ( Pr( α χ ξ ,  (9) 
where  wN,i,Var  is a probability weight equal to the probability that N-i of the N 
elements of a vector distributed N0,Var  are strictly negative. 
 
Measuring Utility Gains from International Diversification 
The spanning tests above suffer from the well-known problem of statistical versus 
economic significance. The spanning tests ask a simple question: If domestic assets span 
foreign assets, what is the probability of observing the given expansion in the ex-post 
mean-variance efficient frontier. Failure to reject the null of spanning suggests that foreign 
assets made British investors better-off but the tests offers no guidance as to the magnitude 
of these welfare gains. To give the shift in ex-post frontiers an economic interpretation we   16
employ the methodology of Cole and Obstfeld (1991), Lewis (2000), and Rowland and 
Tesar (2004) to measure the utility gain associated with a shift in the mean-variance 
frontier. 
Following Lewis (2000), we evaluate the utility gain for an investor with a Epstein-
Zin-Weil expected utility
24  
1 , ; 0 , for 




















t t t t U E C U ,    (10) 
where  γ  and θ  are the coefficients of risk aversion and inverse of the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution respectively. β  is the 28-day discount rate which we set equal 
to .999 . 
Both foreign and domestic asset returns are assumed to be jointly log normally 
distributed. Under these conditions, the expected utility of consumption for an investor 
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where  t W  is wealth at time t and D μ  and 
2
D σ  are the expected return and variance of the 
optimal portfolio comprised of domestic securities alone. Likewise, the expected utility of 
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where  DF μ  and 
2
DF σ  are the expected return and variance of the optimal portfolio formed 
with domestic and foreign stocks. 
Given the set of domestic and foreign assets,  t R [ ] t r , the utility gain from 
diversification can be computed by choosing portfolio weights to maximizing (11)-(12). 
The ratio of the optimal utility with all assets to the optimal utility when the investor is 
constrained to hold domestic assets alone forms our measure of the gains from 
                                                 
24It is customary to use the Epstein-Zin-Weil utility function because this specification allow the risk-
aversion parameter, γ , to differ from the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, θ  . 
25 The utility is only defined if the discount rate is less then 1. This is equivalent to the restriction that 
exp1 −  − 1
2
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diversification. 
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Φ is the percentage increase in wealth required to compensate an investor for the removal 
of foreign assets.  
The diversification benefit in (13) depends upon investors’ risk aversion and 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Unfortunately there is no consensus about the true 
magnitude of risk aversion and intertemporal substitution. Therefore, we report values of 
Φ for a range of risk aversion and intertemporal substitution. 
 
Testing Portfolio Weights 
  In addition to testing the ability of domestic assets to span foreign securities and 
measuring the utility gains provided by overseas investment, financial publications from 
the period allow us to test the optimality of investment allocations.  Given the actual 
market weights from the period we use the Britten-Jones (1999) methodology to test their 
optimality.   
  Britten-Jones (1999) formulate a procedure to estimate optimal portfolio weights 
based on an linear regression of excess returns on the unit vector. Regression t and F-
statistics can be used to calculate confidence intervals and test for the optimality of 
observed Victorian-era portfolio weights. A common drawback to this procedure is 
extraordinary low power. Confidence intervals around the point estimates for the optimal 
weights are invariably large. Many papers using Britten-Jones methodology find optimal 
portfolio weight confidence intervals that are sufficiently wide that one cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that home bias is rational in modern data.
26 Although the spanning 
methodology of Huberman-Kandel (1987) provides a more powerful test of the null that 
the addition of foreign assets expand the mean-variance frontier the Britten-Jones 
methodology allows us to draw inference about individual asset allocations across 
industries and geography. 
 
Results 
                                                 
26 Ahearne ,Griever & Warnock (2004). See Lewis (1999) for a review of the home bias literature.    18
 
We use each of the three methodologies outlined above to measure the gains from 
international diversification for a Victorian British investor.  The gains are quantified 
through the spanning tests, utility gains, and weights tests using different means of 
separating asset classes.  First, we sort the portfolios into six benchmark asset classes.  The 
combination of portfolios that comprise the benchmark sets can be found in the first 
column of Table 3.  Each set represents a different level of international diversification or 
asset type.  We then separate the asset classes further by categorizing stocks and bonds 
into separate industries.  And finally, we attempt to test whether Victorian investors 
actually held “optimal” portfolios by aggregating our asset classes according to the market 
values of different security allocations found in historical financial publications. 
 
Benchmarks 1 through 6: 
 
Table 3 reports the short- and non-short restricted results from the spanning tests 
and Table 4 reports the utility gain from international diversification.  The first set, which 
we call Benchmark 1, contains portfolios comprised of British domestic assets. A test of 
the hypothesis that Benchmark 1 portfolios spanned the foreign portfolios is equivalent to 
asking if British investors who held domestic assets could have expanded their mean-
variance frontier by adding foreign portfolios. 
We can reject the hypothesis that British assets spanned foreign government bonds, 
foreign corporate stocks, and U.S. bond portfolios. We can not reject the hypothesis that 
British assets spanned the foreign corporate bonds or U.S. stock portfolios. Looking at the 
gains in utility from Table 4, the addition of foreign securities resulted in utility gains of 
10 to 89 percent when investors were able to take short positions and 8 to 33 percent when 
short sales were restricted. The magnitude of short-restricted gains available to Victorian 
investors was similar to estimates of the short-restricted utility gains available to modern 
U.S. investors.
27 
With the exception of British Government bonds, foreign government bonds were 
the most popular investment among Victorian-era British investors. By 1883, foreign 
government bonds accounted for 23 percent of the par value of all securities trading on the   19
London Stock Exchange.
28 When one considers the diversification benefits apparent from 
the high returns and low correlations in Tables 1 and 2, the British appetite for foreign 
government bonds is easy to understand.
29 
Did Victorian investors need to diversify beyond foreign government bonds? The 
second set of assets, which we call Benchmark 2, consists of all the domestic portfolios 
contained in the first benchmark plus the foreign government bond portfolio. Tables 3 and 
4 therefore contain the results of the spanning tests and the utility gains from international 
diversification beyond foreign government bonds. 
If short sales were allowed, the inclusion of foreign corporate stock and US bonds 
expanded the mean-variance frontier while the inclusion of foreign corporate bonds and 
US stocks does not. On the other hand, a British investor who was constrained to long 
positions was able to expand their mean-variance frontier by adding foreign debt or equity. 
This expansion was also economically significant, as the addition of foreign debt or equity 
to benchmark 2 allowed for consumption gains up to 40 percent, with utility gains much 
smaller for the short-restricted investor.  While the diversification gains to a British 
investor appear measurably less than the benchmark 1 case, individuals already holding 
foreign sovereign debt and a domestic portfolio could diversify further through investing 
in private debt and equity abroad. 
Was it possible to replicate the return of foreign government bonds with any other 
assets? Benchmark 3 includes every portfolio except the foreign government bond 
portfolio. A test of the hypothesis that the assets in Benchmark 3 span the remaining 
portfolio of foreign government bonds is therefore equivalent to a test of the hypothesis 
that foreign government bonds provided no diversification benefit to a Victorian investor 
who had already diversified across all other domestic and foreign assets. 
The addition of foreign government bonds expanded the mean-variance frontier of 
Victorian investors only when inventors were restricted to long positions. This expansion, 
while statistically significant, offered very small utility gains of no more than 1 percent of 
                                                                                                                                                   
27 Lewis (2000) Table I reports utility gains for risk aversion and IES ranges of 2-5.  Her estimates of modern 
gains from diversification range from 12%-52%. 
28 British Government bonds accounted for 24% of the par value of traded securities. By comparison, foreign 
government bonds accounted for 23%, British railway stocks and bonds accounted for 18%, foreign railway 
stocks and bonds 19% and all other securities 16%. Michie (1999, Table 3.3) 
29Temin (1987) provides an alternative liquidity based explanation of demand for foreign government bonds.   20
consumption without short sales.  
Benchmarks 4 and 5 are designed to evaluate the effect of investing in only debt or 
equities. Critics of Victorian-era capital markets have criticized the reluctance of investors 
to hold equity investments. This “fear of equities may have caused the British stock market 
to perform poorly as a social capital allocation mechanism before World War I and may 
have played a role in British industrial decline.”
30 
Benchmark 4 is comprised of every bond portfolio regardless of geographic 
location while benchmark 5 is comprised of every stock portfolio regardless of geographic 
location.  The results of the spanning tests and the utility gains from diversification outside 
of simply holding all stocks or all bonds can also be found in Tables 3 and 4.  For both sets 
of spanning tests, the results imply that an investor that held all bonds or all stocks, for 
both foreign and domestic assets, could claim diversification benefits by shifting a fraction 
of their portfolio into both debt and equity. The Victorian’s fear of equities appears 
irrational until we take the utility gains into account, after which the Victorian preference 
for debt becomes clear.  For investors holding a portfolio of bonds, the addition of equity 
investments negligibly affect the utility gain from diversification.  On the other hand, 
adding debt to equity only portfolios resulted in utility gains of 10 to 120 percent when 
investors could short and 2 to 120 percent when investors were short restricted. In light of 
these consumption gains, Victorian investors’ choice of debt rather than equity appears to 
reflect rational calculation rather than a “fear of equities.”  
So far, we have treated all foreign investments the same. However, Victorian 
investors had the opportunity to invest abroad without risking their capital in a land 
beyond British rule.  Great Britain's vast 19
th Century Empire provided British investors 
with ample opportunity to diversify their holdings and invest in the high return 
infrastructure projects of the developing world.  Was the British Empire so vast that it 
provided British investors with the ability to diversify their holdings without leaving the 
relative safety of British legal protections?  Or, was there something unique about 
investment in the United States, Latin America or elsewhere that could not be replicated 
by the British Empire? To answer these questions, we sort all corporate assets into value-
weighted British Empire and non-empire stock and bond portfolios. Benchmark 6 consists 
                                                 
30 De Long and Grossman (1992 p.1)    21
of the British government bond portfolio and two new portfolios consisting of all British 
Empire corporate stocks and all British Empire corporate bonds respectively. A test of the 
hypothesis that the assets in benchmark 6 span the remaining assets is equivalent to a test 
of the hypothesis that once Victorian investors had diversified their portfolios throughout 
the empire the addition of non-empire securities had no effect on the mean and variance of 
their optimal portfolios. 
The results again point towards the diversification benefits of foreign fixed-income 
securities.  We only fail to reject the hypothesis of spanning in the case of non-empire 
stocks.  Both foreign government bonds and non-empire bonds expanded the mean-
variance frontiers of Victorian investors.  The gains from investing outside the empire 
were considerable. These gains ranged from 11 to 84 and 6 to 36 percent of wealth 
depending on investors’ preferences and ability to short assets. 
Benchmarks 1 through 3 provide convincing evidence that British Victorian-era 
investors had to look abroad in order to maximize their mean-variance tradeoffs.  The 
measurement of utility gains from diversification with Benchmarks 4 and 5 lends credence 
to the popular explanation that the high level of Victorian overseas investment was due to 
British investors’ preference of debt over equity, particularly foreign government and U.S. 
railroad bonds.
31  Benchmark 6 shows why Victorian investors choose to look outside the 
British Empire to find suitable investments. 
 
Industry Spanning Tests and “New” British Industries 
 
While the tests on the above benchmarks highlight the overall benefits of foreign 
investment, our data permit a more refined test of the theory that Britain’s capital markets 
failed to sufficiently fund specific industry.  In particular, we are able to value weight at 
the industry level to test whether investors in a particular industry could diversify further 
by investing in the foreign analog of that industry.  Furthermore, industry-level data will 
allow us to test the argument that capital market failure was partially responsible for the 
decline of British industry.  We create a set of value-weighted indexes of stocks and bonds 
from “new growth” industries that dominate trade and development in the 20
th century.  
                                                 
31See Kennedy (1987) for a discussion of  the Victorian’s preference for foreign debt.   22
We then test for diversification benefits when investors held a portfolio comprised of “new 
growth” industries.  Tables 5 and 6 contain the results of spanning tests and measures of 
utility gains for the industry and “new” industry indexes, respectively. 
  For the basic industry analysis, each stock or bond return is grouped according to 
the categories outlined in the Investors Monthly Manual.  This approach, while useful for 
the delineation of securities within our dataset also follows the common industry-grouping 
characterization of the Victorian period.
32  The industries include railroads, finance, 
electric and petroleum, telephone and telegraph, miscellaneous, iron coal and steel, mines, 
and steamship and shipping.  The spanning test evaluates if a British investor who held 
British government bonds and domestic securities from a single industry could expand 
their mean-variance frontier by investing in foreign securities from the same industry.  
Overall, the spanning tests and the measures of the utility gains from 
diversification presented in Table 5 are consistent with our earlier findings.  Outside of the 
electric and petroleum and the iron, coal, and steel industries, we reject that short restricted 
investors could span the foreign securities with the risk free asset and domestic holdings.  
When short sales are allowed the rejection rate decreases, and the British investors mean-
variance frontier was expanded with overseas investment in railroads, financial, telephone 
and telegraph, and the miscellaneous industries.  In terms of utility gains, investors in 
particular British industries see the highest utility gains from holding foreign railroads, 
financial companies, and steamship and ship building industries. Together, these two sets 
of results provide additional evidence that there were significant gains to be had by 
investing outside of British industry, particularly when Victorian investors funneled their 
wealth into foreign railroads, financial companies, and steamship and shipping companies. 
  British investors gained significantly by holding broad value-weighted portfolios of 
foreign securities or foreign portfolios for a particular industry.  It is argued that a capital 
market failure, caused by a lack of sufficient funding for the continued development of 
domestic industry, contributed to the relative decline of British industry. To test this we 
construct a set of domestic holdings of “new” industries, comprised of value-weighted 
portfolios of securities from developing industries.  We define “new” industries as   23
electricity, petroleum, telephone, telegraph, iron, coal, steel, and miscellaneous 
commercial and industrial companies.  If the portfolios of new industries dominate foreign 
investment, either through spanning foreign securities or through foreign stocks and bonds 
providing little additional utility gain to investors, than the case can be made that financing 
was misappropriated.  The tests in particular examine whether a mean-variance investor 
holding 5 value-weighted portfolios of “new” industries (electricity and petroleum, 
telephone and telegraph, iron, coal, and steel, miscellaneous commercial and industrial 
companies, and the risk-free asset) could expand his or her mean-variance frontier or 
increase their utility by investing in foreign government bonds, foreign corporate stocks, 
foreign corporate bonds, or US stocks or Bonds.  The results of the “new” British industry 
spanning and utility gains tests can be found in Table 6. 
  The tests in Table 6 provide evidence that even when British investors held a broad 
array of “new” industry securities the addition of foreign securities significantly expanded 
their risk return tradeoffs. Only when short sales were allowed did foreign corporate stocks 
and US stocks not significantly expand the mean-variance frontier; the addition of foreign 
bonds expanded the frontier even when short sales were allowed. Particularly large utility 
gains result from investing in foreign government bonds, foreign corporate bonds, and US 
bonds.  Foreign corporate bonds offered up to 238 percent utility gain over our “new 
growth” industries, followed by the possibility of 130 percent gain with U.S. Bonds, and 
an 84 percent gain for foreign government bonds. A British investor who increased his 
funding of new industry at the expense of foreign diversification would have been worse 
off. 
 
Were the Holdings of British Investors Optimal? 
  Ronald Michie’s 1999 work The London Stock Exchange: A History tabulates the 
composition of securities listed on London Stock Exchange in ten year intervals starting in 
1853.  Michie’s Table 3.3 reports the value weights of portfolios of British sovereign debt, 
foreign sovereign debt, domestic and foreign railways, financial securities, and three 
                                                                                                                                                   
32 Normal market turnover, brought about by stocks and bonds being delisted or reaching maturity, 
respectively, creates several thin periods of time within our data series, restricting us from further 
disaggregation below level of IMM industrial categories.   24
categories of miscellaneous stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange.
33 
  Using Britten-Jones’ (1999) methodology, we test whether the actual weights at a 
specific point in time are statistically different from the optimal weights. We calculate for 
the optimal portfolio weights of a mean-variance investor for three points in time: 1883, 
1893, and for 1903. The optimal portfolio weights are estimated from returns over a 10-
year interval centered on the dates for which Michie reports actual portfolio weights. We 
estimate the optimal weights for varying levels of risk aversion (γ).
34 Table 7 contains the 
true market weights and the results of Britten-Jones’ hypothesis test that the true weights 
are statistically indistinguishable from the optimal weights.   
  Table 7 re-affirms the low power common in tests of the optimality of a set of 
market weights. For 1883 and 1893, except for one case, regardless of the level of risk 
aversion or how much an optimal investor might short, we cannot reject that the optimal 
weights are statistically different from the market weights.  Simple ocular econometrics 
would lead one to believe that the market weights for every year are very different from 
the estimated optimal weights.  However, we can only reject the null hypothesis that the 
1903 weights are equal to optimal weights.  The rejection in 1903 results from the large 
deviations of the optimal weights from the market weights as mean-variance investors 
attempt to significantly short domestic bonds while simultaneously placing a large positive 
weight on financial stocks. Given the magnitude of the differences between actual and 
optimal weights, our failure to reject in 1883 and 1893 is almost surely due to the low 
power of the test methodology, and where the markets weights are rejected as sub-optimal, 
we learn very little.  
 
Conclusion 
                                                 
33The miscellaneous categories in Michie mirror the miscellaneous commercial companies discussed earlier, 
but we can further aggregate these securities into three categories in order to closely fit the market weights 
from the Stock Exchange Official Intelligence.  The three miscellaneous categories are social infrastructure, 
commercial and industrial, and tea, coffee and raw materials. Social Infrastructure contains canals, docks, 
gas, electric, telegraph, telephone, tramways, omnibus, and waterworks companies.  Commercial and 
Industrial contains commercial and industrial, breweries, distilleries, iron, coal, steel, and shipping 
companies.  Tea, Coffee, and Raw Materials contains mines, nitrate, oil, tea, coffee, and rubber companies. 
34 The results are robust to alternative interval lengths used to estimate the optimal weights. Although Michie 
reports market weights for 1873, which is included in our panel, we cannot test if those weights were optimal 
due to data limitations.  The miscellaneous sectors were not reported separately in the Investors Monthly 
Manual until 1872.     25
Why did British investors send so much of their capital abroad? Because that's 
where the returns were. The benefits of overseas investments were not limited to 
competitive returns, however. The real benefit of international investing was the 
diversification benefit of holding foreign assets that had a low correlation with their 
domestic counterparts.  
Proponents of the view that Victorian capital markets failed have argued that the 
high level of Victorian foreign investment and any evidence of domestic returns 
commensurate with foreign returns must be proof of bias. When one considers the low 
correlation between domestic and foreign investments, however, it becomes obvious that a 
proper test of market failure is far more stringent. Before we can deem Victorian investors 
irrational, we must not only show that domestic assets had commensurately high returns 
but also that it was possible to form a domestic portfolio with the low variance of an 
internationally diversified portfolio.  
What about the claim that British investors and the British economy could have 
done better by investing at home? These counter-factual investments never occurred, so 
we cannot evaluate their benefits directly. Given the assets that did exist, we can reject the 
claim that British Victorian-era investors acted irrationally when purchasing foreign assets. 
A British investor who increased his investment in new British industry at the expense of 
foreign diversification would have been worse off.  
In light of the observed benefits of international diversification, it is no surprise 
that British Victorian-era investors' sent capital overseas. By sending a portion of their 
capital abroad, Victorian investors were able to increase their returns while simultaneously 
decreasing the risk of their portfolios. Victorians did not invest overseas due to bias or 
ignorance. Instead, the Victorians sent capital overseas in search of both the high returns 
and diversification that rational investors crave.   26
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British Govt. Bonds 1 0.3539 0.2897 0.2995 0.2206 0.241 0.167 0.2378
British Corp. Stocks 0.3539 1 0.4267 0.3992 0.3865 0.3776 0.2914 0.3347
British Corp. Bonds 0.2897 0.4267 1 0.2774 0.1722 0.2221 0.119 0.2175
Foreign Govt. Bonds 0.2995 0.3992 0.2774 1 0.3866 0.4113 0.2713 0.3535
Foreign Corp. Stocks 0.2206 0.3865 0.1722 0.3866 1 0.5502 0.9658 0.5624
Foreign Corp. Bonds 0.241 0.3776 0.2221 0.4113 0.5502 1 0.4984 0.7668
U.S. Stocks 0.167 0.2914 0.119 0.2713 0.9658 0.4984 1 0.5441
U.S. Bonds 0.2378 0.3347 0.2175 0.3535 0.5624 0.7668 0.5441 1
Note:  Foreign corporate stocks and bonds include U.S. securities
Table 2: Correlation Coefficients  1866-1907




























British Govt. Bonds short sales p-values 0.002 0.000 0.178 0.134 0.000
British Corp. Stocks
British Corp. Bonds short restricted  p-values 0.000 0.000 0.127 0.205 0.000
British Govt. Bonds short sales p-values 0.000 0.411 0.278 0.000
British Corp. Stocks
British Corp. Bonds short restricted  p-values 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000
ForeignGovt. Bonds
British Govt. Bonds short sales p-values 0.393
British Corp. Stocks
British Corp. Bonds short restricted  p-values 0.000
Foreign Corp. Stocks
Foreign Corp. Bonds
British Govt. Bonds short sales p-values 0.000 0.000 0.700
British Corp. Bonds
Foreign Govt. Bonds short restricted  p-values 0.000 0.000 0.000
Foreign Corp. Bonds
British Corp. Stocks short sales p-values 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Foreign Corp. Stocks
short restricted  p-values 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Empire Stocks short sales p-values 0.003 0.339 0
Empire Bonds
short restricted  p-values 0.000 0.469 0
Note:  Each benchmark above is composed of several value-weighted portfolios; each test asset is one value-weighted portfolio.
              Table 3: Do Domestic Assets Span Foreign Assets?







Benchmark 2Benchmark 1 θ=2 θ=3 θ=5 θ=2 θ=3 θ=5
γ=2 0.89 0.40 0.19 0.25 0.13 0.07
British Govt. Bonds γ=3 0.70 0.33 0.16 0.26 0.14 0.07
British Corp. Stocks γ=5 0.53 0.26 0.13 0.27 0.15 0.08
British Corp. Bonds γ=10 0.37 0.20 0.10 0.28 0.15 0.08
γ=30 0.33 0.19 0.10 0.33 0.19 0.10
Benchmark 2
γ=2 0.40 0.20 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.02
British Govt. Bonds γ=3 0.35 0.17 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.03
British Corp. Stocks γ=5 0.28 0.14 0.07 0.12 0.07 0.03
British Corp. Bonds γ=10 0.22 0.12 0.06 0.17 0.09 0.05
ForeignGovt. Bonds γ=30 0.24 0.14 0.07 0.23 0.13 0.07
Benchmark 3
British Govt. Bonds γ=2 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
British Corp. Stocks γ=3 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
British Corp. Bonds γ=5 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Foreign Corp. Stocks γ=10 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Foreign Corp. Bonds γ=30 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
Benchmark 4
γ=2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
British Govt. Bonds γ=3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
British Corp. Bonds γ=5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Foreign Govt. Bonds γ=10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Foreign Corp. Bonds γ=30 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Benchmark 5
γ=2 1.12 0.50 0.23 0.06 0.04 0.02
British Corp. Stocks γ=3 0.79 0.37 0.18 0.12 0.06 0.03
Foreign Corp. Stocks γ=5 0.53 0.26 0.13 0.18 0.10 0.05
γ=10 0.40 0.21 0.11 0.28 0.15 0.08
γ=30 1.25 0.68 0.35 1.23 0.67 0.35
Benchmark 6
γ=2 0.84 0.38 0.18 0.22 0.12 0.06
Empire Stocks γ=3 0.69 0.33 0.16 0.23 0.12 0.06
Empire Bonds γ=5 0.53 0.26 0.13 0.25 0.13 0.07
γ=10 0.40 0.21 0.11 0.29 0.16 0.08
γ=30 0.38 0.21 0.11 0.36 0.20 0.11
              Table 4: Measuring Utility Gains from Diversification
Note:  Foreign securities included for the measurement of utility gain, unless specified within the benchmark, are value-weighted 
portfolios of: foreign government bonds, foreign stocks, foreign corporate bonds, and non-empire stocks and bonds.  For benchmark 6, 
the foreign securities are indexes of non-empire bonds and non-empire stocks.
Gain with Short Sales Gain w/o Short Sales
Utility gain measured as the percentage increase in wealth required to compensate an investor for 
the removal of foreign assets for different values of risk aversion (γ) and the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution (θ).Table 5: Industry Spanning Tests and Utility Gains
Spanning p-values
Utility Gain
θ=2 θ=3 θ=5 θ=2 θ=3 θ=5 θ=2 θ=3 θ=5 θ=2 θ=3 θ=5
0.50 0.26 0.13 0.49 0.26 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01
0.37 0.20 0.10 0.37 0.20 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.26 0.15 0.08 0.26 0.15 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
0.18 0.11 0.06 0.18 0.11 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
0.26 0.24 0.20 0.26 0.24 0.20 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.36 0.19 0.10 0.30 0.16 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.10 0.06 0.03
0.27 0.14 0.07 0.23 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.02
0.18 0.10 0.05 0.18 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02
0.12 0.07 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02
0.11 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05
0.26 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
0.20 0.11 0.06 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
0.14 0.08 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.09 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.07 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.17 0.09 0.28 0.16 0.08
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.12 0.06 0.19 0.11 0.06
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.13 0.08 0.04
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.03
0.00 n.a. n.a. 0.00 n.a. n.a. 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08
Note:  n.a. denotes that expected utility is not defined.
Industry
Miscellaneous















Telephone & Telegraph 0.01 0.00
Short Sales
Electric & Petroleum 0.48 1.00 0.00
0.28 Finance 0.08 0.00


































Iron, Coal, & Steel
The tabulated p-values result from a test of the hypothesis that the risk-free asset and a value-weighted index of stocks in a particular domestic industry span 
a value weighted index of foreign stocks in the same industry.  Utility gain is the percentage increase in wealth required to compensate an investor for the 
removal of the foreign industry from a portfolio including the foreign industry, a risk free asset, and the domestic industry for different values of risk 















θ=2 θ=3 θ=5 θ=2 θ=3 θ=5
Foreign Govt. Bonds
γ=2 0.30 0.15 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
γ=3 0.29 0.15 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
γ=5 0.29 0.15 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.01
γ=10 0.32 0.18 0.09 0.24 0.13 0.07
γ=30 0.84 0.59 0.38 0.83 0.59 0.38
Foreign Corp. Bonds
γ=2 0.98 0.43 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00
γ=3 0.95 0.42 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00
γ=5 0.93 0.43 0.20 0.06 0.04 0.02
γ=10 0.98 0.48 0.23 0.39 0.21 0.11
γ=30 2.38 1.32 0.71 2.08 1.19 0.66
Foreign Corp. Stocks
γ=2 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
γ=3 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
γ=5 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
γ=10 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
γ=30 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03
U.S. Stocks
γ=2 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
γ=3 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
γ=5 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
γ=10 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
γ=30 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
U.S. Bonds
γ=2 0.58 0.27 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00
γ=3 0.56 0.27 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00
γ=5 0.54 0.27 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.02
γ=10 0.56 0.29 0.15 0.31 0.17 0.09
γ=30 1.29 0.84 0.50 1.27 0.83 0.50
Table 6: New British Industry Spanning Tests and Utility Gains
Short Sales Short Restricted
0.56 0.00
0.00 0.00
Short Sales Short Restricted
0.00
The tabulated p-values result from a test of the hypothesis that the risk-free asset and value-weighted 
indexes of "new industry" assets span foreign test assets.  Utility gain is the percentage increase in 
wealth required to compensate an investor for the removal of the foreign assets from the domestic 
"new industry" portfolio for different values of risk aversion (γ) and the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution (θ).
Note:  New British industry is a combination of secveral value-weighted portfolio of stocks from developing industries, including 





0.71 0.002351 0 3 0
British government bond index 0.25 -2.89 -1.85 -0.89 -0.11 0.40
foreign government bond index 0.27 4.55 3.02 1.80 0.90 0.31
British Railroad index 0.18 -0.56 -0.36 -0.21 -0.10 -0.02
Foreign Railroad index 0.23 1.69 1.15 0.70 0.35 0.12
Financial stocks 0.03 1.20 0.91 0.62 0.39 0.23
Social Infrastructure
* 0.03 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.05 0.00
Commercial and Industrial
* 0.01 -2.84 -1.78 -0.98 -0.40 -0.02
Tea, Coffee, and Raw Materials
* 0.01 -0.32 -0.25 -0.16 -0.08 -0.03
p-value for rejecting null 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.14 0.01
2351 0 3 0
British government bond index 0.18 -6.59 -4.33 -2.47 -1.02 -0.06
foreign government bond index 0.21 1.49 0.93 0.72 0.52 0.32
British Railroad index 0.17 2.69 1.66 1.06 0.51 0.14
Foreign Railroad index 0.32 -1.27 -0.82 -0.48 -0.25 -0.12
Financial stocks 0.04 -2.86 -1.57 -0.94 -0.44 0.02
Social Infrastructure 0.03 4.03 2.86 1.73 0.93 0.42
Commercial and Industrial 0.04 3.55 2.37 1.47 0.81 0.33
Tea, Coffee, and Raw Materials 0.01 -0.03 -0.10 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05
p-value for rejecting null 0.64 0.64 0.62 0.57 0.19
2351 0 3 0
British government bond index 0.16 -12.80 -8.47 -4.93 -2.27 -0.43
foreign government bond index 0.20 -1.26 -0.63 -0.30 -0.06 0.07
British Railroad index 0.16 -1.61 -1.04 -0.59 -0.26 -0.02
Foreign Railroad index 0.28 3.92 2.64 1.58 0.78 0.27
Financial stocks 0.06 14.26 9.57 5.92 3.18 1.32
Social Infrastructure 0.03 2.14 1.44 0.88 0.46 0.17
Commercial and Industrial 0.10 -3.81 -2.53 -1.51 -0.75 -0.25
Tea, Coffee, and Raw Materials 0.01 0.17 0.02 -0.05 -0.10 -0.13
p-value for rejecting null 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note:  Optimal weights from Stock Exchange Official Intelligence as cited in Michie (Table 3.3, 1999)
Social Infrastructure contains canals, docks, gas, electric, telegraph, telephone, tramways, omnibus, and waterworks companies
Commercial and Industrial contains commercial and industrial, breweries, distilleries, iron, coal, steel, and shipping companies
Tea, Coffee, and Raw Materials contains mines, nitrate, oil, tea, coffee, and rubber companies
Optimal Weights for gamma = 
The following table presents the actual market weights, the optimal portfolio weights evaluated for a given 
level of risk aversion (γ), and the p-value for null hypothesis that the optimal weights are equal to the true 
market weights.




Optimal Weights for gamma = 
Market 
Weights
Optimal Weights for gamma = 
1883
1893
Market 
Weights